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INTRODUCTION
With the blurring of the corporation’s traditional boundaries, new forms of contracting
have progressively emerged. Outsourcing is one of the most prominent ones. In this paper, we
focus on outsourcing as an instance of vertical disintegration (i.e. letting suppliers take over
activities that were once undertaken in-house) which has been far less researched (Boone and
Verbedeke, 1991) than the classical ‘make or buy’ issue (Williamson, 1985; Shelanski and
Klein, 1995).
Outsourcing as an instance of vertical disintegration is currently booming in service and
support activities (Quinn, 1992; Outsourcing Institute, 1997).  Service outsourcing has
recently moved beyond basic activities (e.g., gardening, catering and cleaning) to encompass
more elaborate activities of the value chain (e.g., information technology systems,
telecommunications, transportation, logistics, R&D).  Though outsourcing as an instance of
vertical disintegration has received extensive coverage from the managerial literature (Lacity
and Hirschheim, 1993; Lacity, Willcocks and Feeny, 1995; Saunders, Gebelt and Hu, 1997;
Useem and Harder, 2000), it has been quite neglected in the academic literature (Domberger
and Li, 1995; Lei and Hitt, 1995).  There have not been a lot of changes since Joskow (1985:
33) made the following comment: “Most of the empirical work (using TCE) has focused on
examining the choice between vertical integration and the market (...) analysis of contracts
has been minimal”.  Indeed, there is a dearth of fine-grained studies of organizational forms
such as outsourcing.3
The claim of the present article is that the standard TCE is too loose when it comes to the
concept of asset specificity.  A more fine-grained differentiation between the different types
of specificity is necessary. In this paper, we distinguish between three types of specificity:
core specificity, transactional specificity, and relational specificity.
In the case of vertical disintegration, firms have invested in activities that fit with their
needs and requirements and contribute to their competitive advantage (i.e., core specificity).
These activities rest on dedicated employees and equipment (i.e., transactional specificity).
Finally, outsourcing also entails a long-term relationship between the client and the
outsourcer. Relational specificity refers to the specific assets developed over the course of this
relationship.
In this paper, we focus on the link between the three types of specificity and the
complexity of outsourcing contracts because specificity is generally considered as the most
important transaction cost attribute. We also integrate external uncertainty in our model.
External uncertainty is a multidimensional concept that reflects the lack of knowledge about
events that may take place in the environment (Joskow, 1988a, b; Klein, 1988; Sutcliffe and
Zaheer, 1998).
In the first section, we introduce the theoretical background for the study and the
hypotheses.  We then present the methodology.  In the third section, we provide the empirical
results of our study.  We then discuss our results before concluding with the implications and
the limitations of the study.
TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS, RESOURCE-BASED VIEW AND
OUTSOURCING
Outsourcing as bilateral governance
Over the last 25 years, Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1975, 1985 and4
1996) has emerged as the most widely used theoretical explanation of boundary choice. High
levels of idiosyncrasy (i.e. asset specificity) generally characterize activities that have been
historically internalized generally. Hence, outsourcing may be defined as a hybrid form of
governance that rests on complex medium or long-term contracts (Quinn, 2000). With the
prominent exception of the literature on long-term contracts however (Crocker and Masten,
1988, 1991; Goldberg and Erickson, 1987; Joskow, 1985, 1987, 1988a, b, 1990; Masten and
Crocker, 1985; Mulherin, 1986), most of the empirical research using TCE has focused on the
link between transaction attributes and governance structures (i.e., market, firm or hybrid
form) (Klein and Shelanski, 1995).
Outsourcing is a strategic decision.  After investing in a specific activity (i.e.,
telecommunications network, information system, and logistic platform…) over a certain
period of time, a firm decides to transfer equipment and employees to an outside vendor.  As
continuity of service is required, a bilateral governance mechanism between the client and
outsourcer must be set up. TCE is useful to analyze bilateral governance, there are some
limitations about the meaning of ‘asset specificity’ developed by TCE.  The definition of
specificity is fully related to the ‘make or buy’ decision and does not take account previous
specific investments.  Moreover, TCE does not differentiate between the idiosyncratic
investments done before a transaction, during a transaction and after.  In case of outsourcing
contracts, we show that specificity has different meanings.
Core specificity
Core specificity refers to the extent to which resources contribute to the competitive
advantage of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984).  This concept is theoretically rooted in the
Resource-Based View of the firm (RBV).  Firms are seen as repositories of resources and
capabilities.  According to Penrose (1959), the firm is a heterogeneous bundle of resources
and an entity that accumulates knowledge. Those firms that possess superior resources will5
earn rents (Teece, 1982, Wernerfelt, 1984; Conner, 1991).  For tge RBV, the firm’s
accumulated pool of resources has two significant properties.  First, the nature of these
resources and capabilities is mainly ‘time dependent’.  It also has tacit dimension, making it
difficult to transfer from one firm to another.  Second, it is assumed that the basis of these
resources consists of a collection of assets, such as organizational capital.
However, the firm is not a simple collection of resources. Interactions and development of
firm-specific combinations is far more important.  Prahalad and Hamel’s (1988) definition of
what constitutes a firm’s ‘core competencies’ as the “collective learning in the organization,
especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of
technology” can also be characterized as ‘organizational capital’.  These resources meet four
criteria: value, rareness, imperfect imitability and absence of substitutes (Barney, 1991: 106).
Commenting on Barney (1991), Monteverde (1997: 100) notices that: “the concept of a
firm’s set of exceptional strategic resources as defined by the four considerations above has a
parallel in the transaction cost literature as the economic construct “asset specificity”. We
suggest that core specificity must be distinguished from transactional specificity because
firms have invested in core resources prior outsourcing them (Nooteboom, 1993; Teece,
1988). According to this view, the firm consists of a bundle of heterogeneous resources. Each
firm accumulates very different and idiosyncratic resources. On the one hand, they are the
result of an accumulation process throughout the history of the firm. On the other hand, they
are complex and are tightly held by the organization.
Transactional specificity
Transactional specificity refers to the traditional asset specificity of TCE. Most scholars
currently distinguish between six dimensions of asset specificity: site, specific product or
service, human resources, dedicated assets, brand and temporal specificity (Williamson,
1989).  The TCE concept of specific assets is of crucial importance. If specific assets are6
engaged in a transaction, there will be a dependence between transacting partners. This
dependence yields transaction costs if there is risk of opportunism and if rationality is
bounded (Williamson, 1985).  In TCE, the paradigmatic case of a supplier that uses
transaction-specific assets to deliver a good or service that is tailored to the demand of a
single customer is an important one.  As Nooteboom writes: “‘specificity’ means something
like this: ‘to achieve a given purpose there is no alternative for a given means’” (1993: 443).
Transactional specificity is a sufficient condition for dependence. It also has an impact on
contractual environment and devices.  Transactional specificity creates dependence and
entails a risk of ‘hold-up’.
Relational specificity
Relational specificity refers to the extent to which resources must be developed to deal
with a particular vendor instead of carrying out an activity internally. Firms engage
outsourcing relationships to obtain access to complementary resources while focusing on core
competencies.  Akin to transactional specificity, relational specificity creates a small number
of exchange condition that leads to high transaction costs. Relational specificity refers to the
extent to which an outsourcing client adapts to the particular requirements of its vendor
(Malone, Yates and Benjamin, 1987).  In the context of service outsourcing, relational
specificity has both a human and procedural dimension (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995).  In
general, most specific investments lie on the side of the outsourcing vendor.  Of course, the
client may also make specific investments to adjust to the vendor.  In this paper, we show that
relational specificity is a mechanism of mutual dependence.  Specific investments have two
effects. On the one hand, they increase switching costs and the size of damage in case of hold-
up. On the other hand, they increase value to the partner, making it more captive and reducing
the probability of hold-up.7
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Impact of core specificity on outsourcing contract complexity
The resources that constitute the core business of a firm must be accumulated during a
long-term process (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Foss, 1994; Quélin, 1996). When such resources
are transferred to outside vendors, complex contracts are necessary to avoid disruption.
Contrary to the link between transaction specificity and contract complexity, the link between
core specificity and contract complexity has nothing to do with the opportunism hypothesis
(Conner and Prahalad, 1996). Complex contracts are necessary to make sure the competitive
advantage of the firm will not be threatened. Hence, we hypothesize a positive impact of core
specificity on the complexity of outsourcing contracts:
Hypothesis 1: The higher the core specificity, the more complex the contract.
Impact of transactional specificity on outsourcing contract complexity
As Dyer (1997: 535) very clearly states it: “The standard (transaction cost) reasoning is
that as asset specificity increase, more complex governance structures (i.e., more complex
contracts) are required to eliminate or attenuate costly bargaining over profits from
specialized assets”. Most empirical studies using TCE have tested the link between asset
specificity and one of the three governance structures (i.e., market, hybrid form and firm).
However, the impact of asset specificity on contractual clauses has rarely been empirically
explored, except for the link between asset specificity and the “contract duration” clause
(Joskow, 1985, 1987).  By extending this reasoning to the overall structure of the contract, we
suggest that the likelihood of dense contracts and the benefits of contracting increase with the
value of asset-specific investments.
Hypothesis 2: The higher the transactional specificity, the more complex the contract.8
Impact of relational specificity on outsourcing contract complexity
When a firm entrusts an outsourcer with an activity, business process assets dedicated to
this particular outsourcer relationship are developed (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). These
assets must be protected against the potential opportunism of the vendor. Hence, the
development of specific relational assets should also lead to more complex outsourcing
contracts.
Hypothesis 3: The higher the relational specificity, the more complex the contract.
Impact of core specificity on transactional specificity
Several authors have suggested that “core competencies” rely on highly idiosyncratic
assets (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1997; Monteverde, 1997; Reve, 1990). For
instance, Barney (1997: 33) has suggested that “Resources and capabilities that build up over
long periods of time (history) are likely to be characterized by high levels of transaction-
specific investments”. Similarly, Amit and Schoemaker (1993: 35) contend that “Capabilities
… refer to a firm’s capacity to deploy resources, usually combination using organizational
processes, to effect a desired end. They are information-based, tangible and intangible
processes that are firm-specific and are developed over time through complex interactions
among the firm’s resources”. Surprisingly, this link has not been empirically tested so far.
Hence we posit that resources characterized by core specificity will also be characterized by
transactional specificity.
Hypothesis 4: The higher the core specificity, the higher the transactional specificity
Impact of environmental uncertainty on outsourcing contract complexity
Most existing empirical studies show that vertical integration is necessary when the9
relevant contingencies are numerous or unpredictable.  Williamson (1991) suggests that
hybrid governance forms such as outsourcing are very sensitive to external uncertainty.  As
adaptations cannot be made unilaterally (as with market) or by fiat (as with hierarchy), hybrid
forms require mutual consent.  The costs generated by the contract are manifold. They
include:: i) the cost of devising optimal responses to future contingencies; ii) the cost of
renegotiating the terms of the contract; iii) the costs of failing to adjust the contract to new
circumstances. External uncertainty requires specification and verification of performance and
efforts done by the outsourcing vendor.  When uncertainty is high, outsourcing contracts
should be very detailed to make monitoring less difficult and facilitate adjustments (Klein,
1988; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993).  Complex contractual clauses should be built in the
contract to permit adjustments as events unfold (Masten, 1984) and avoid constant
renegotiations aimed at reaching mutual consent (Walker and Weber, 1984). Hence, we
propose that external uncertainty has also a positive impact on contractual complexity.
Hypothesis 5: In case of long term outsourcing contract, the higher the environmental
uncertainty, the more complex the contract.
METHODOLOGY
Sample and data collection
We collected detailed primary data on outsourcing operations through a survey of
European and American firms.  As there was no systematic database on “vertical
disintegration” operations, we conducted an extensive analysis of the press (i.e., international
newspapers and specialized magazines) between 1990 and 1998.  In order to spot outsourcing
contracts announcements, we made an exhaustive electronic search of two major databases:
ABI/INFORM-GLOBAL and REUTERS.  The initial sample consisted of 816 “vertical
disintegration” outsourcing contracts that were signed between 1992 and 1997.  This period10
was chosen to exclude older outsourcing contracts for which managerial turnover would have
prevented collecting accurate information on the conditions prevailing at the time the contract
was signed.
A total of 91 completed questionnaires were returned so that the response rate is slightly
higher than 11%. This response rate is consistent with that of other empirical studies on
outsourcing (e.g., Ang and Cummins, 1997). Of these 91 questionnaires (i.e. collected from
91 different firms), 9 had to be dropped because of missing data.  Hence, we were left with 82
usable questionnaires. We tested for a potential response bias by comparing the respondents
and non-respondents on two key organization features: total sales and number of employees.
1
This technique is very usual and has been used in recent outsourcing studies such as Teng,
Cheon and Grover (1995) or Ang and Cummings (1997).  The data were obtained from
Compact Disclosure and Kompass Europe (i.e., its European equivalent).  Consistent with
Teng, Cheon and Grover (1995), we randomly selected a subsample of 30 non-respondents
and compared their total sales and number of employees with those of the 82 respondents.
The results of the t-tests (respectively t = 0.346 for total sales and t = 0.625 for number of
employees) showed no difference at the significance level of 0.05.  Consequently the results
from our study may be generalized to the whole sample.
Control for response bias and data heterogeneity
Industry
Data were collected in randomly selected industries.  Though there is evidence that
industry type has no impact on outsourcing strategies (Loh and Venkatraman, 1992; Teng,
Cheon and Grover, 1995), we included a binary dummy variable for service and industrial
sectors.11
Country
Data were collected in Europe and in North America. Hence, we included a binary dummy
variable (i.e. European and American outsourcing contracts) to control for the impact of the
country of origin.
Type of activity outsource
Most empirical studies on service outsourcing have focused on Information Technology
(IT) (Saunders, Gebelt and Hu, 1997; Lacity and Willcocks, 1998) and Research and
Development (R&D) activities (Pisano, 1990; Ulset, 1996).  Contrary to these studies, we
used a sample composed of different service activities.  Basically, we believe the TCE
framework is robust enough to simultaneously deal with different activities.  As IT and
telecommunications are the most “pervasive” activities, we included a dummy variable for IT
and non-IT activities (Applegate, McFarlan and McKenney, 1999).
Measures and Variables
The constructs were operationalized with a mix of original and adapted scales derived from
the conceptual definition of the constructs, the literature and field interviews.
Transactional specificity
Though asset specificity is probably the most important attribute of TCE, there is no
commonly accepted operationalization of this concept  (Lohtia, Brooks and Krapfel, 1994;
Klein and Shelanski, 1995).  Generally, assets are considered specific when they are not
redeployable to alternative uses (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Williamson, 1985: 53). In the case
of outsourcing, dedicated employees and equipment have generally been transferred to the
vendor.  The “redeployability” criterion does not make much sense in the context of
outsourcing because the level of specificity is maintained (at least at the beginning).
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1 Results are available on request.12
Consistent with the literature (Anderson and Weitz, 1986; Poppo and Zenger, 1998), we
operationalized asset specificity as (1) the cost to switch vendors; (2) the time to switch
vendors; (3) the cost to reintegrate the outsource activity; (4) the time to reintegrate the
outsource activity.  All four variables were measured on a five-point Likert scale from “very
low” to “very high”.
Core specificity
There is no accepted tool to evaluate the degree of core specificity of an activity. Criteria
such as value, rareness, non-imitability and non-substitutability (Barney, 1991) have been
developed to spot the “crown’s jewels” of the firm (Montgomery, 1995). They do not seem to
be very useful to compare outsourced service activities. Hence, we operationalized core
specificity with a mix of criteria from the managerial literature. Four items were used: (1)
degree to which the activity contributes to the overall profitability of the firm (Barney, 1997;
Quinn and Hilmer, 1994); (2) degree to which the activity enables direct contact with the end
customer (Quinn, Doorley and Paquette, 1990; Aersten, 1993, Prahalad and Hamel, 1990); (3)
degree to which the activity enables the company to differentiate itself from its competitors in
the eyes of the customers (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Stalk, Evans and Schulman, 1992) and (4)
degree to which the activity is viewed as strategic (Teng, Cheon and Grover, 1995). All four
variables were measured on a five-point Likert scale from “very little” to “very highly”.
Relational specificity
We operationalized relational specificity using two items: (1) extent to which dealing with
the vendor implied changes for the other employees in the client firm; (2) extent to which
dealing with the vendor implied changes for the overall functioning of the client firm. Both
items were based on Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995).13
External uncertainty
We operationalized external uncertainty as the difficulty of evaluating the future needs of
the outsourcing clients.  Four items were used : (1) uncertainty regarding the expected
technology (Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt, 1986; Walker and Weber, 1984, 1987); (2)
uncertainty regarding the expected volume and activity levels (Anderson and Schmittlein,
1984; Walker and Weber, 1984; John and Weitz, 1988). (3) uncertainty regarding the
expected performance and (4) uncertainty regarding the expected human competencies.  The
latter two items were suggested by interviews with managers. All four items were measured
on a five-point Likert scale from “very easy to assess” to “very hard to assess”.
Contract complexity
We term contractual complexity the extent to which outsourcing contracts are comprised of
elaborate clauses.  Such clauses are necessary to manage the potential opportunism of the
supplier and changes in the environment.  The law and economic literature has suggested that
several types of clauses are paramount in outsourcing contracts: (1) control clauses; (2)
incentive clauses; (3) price clauses (Crocker and Masten, 1991; Joskow, 1988b); (4) evolution
clauses (Joskow, 1988a) and (5) end of contract clauses (Masten, 1988; Wiggins, 1991).
For each type of clause, we averaged between three to five items:
  control clauses:  (a) service level reports with service level measures; (b) regular client
and supplier meetings; (c) internal or external end-user surveys; (d) annual review; (e)
cash penalty for non-performance
  incentive clauses:  (a) cash bonuses in case of performance superior to that specified in the
contract ; (b) escalation procedures; (c)  risk and reward sharing
  price clauses:  (a) fixed price; (b) indexing of price on a market average cost; (c) indexing
on best suppliers’ prices through “benchmarking”
  evolution clause : (a) adjustment of charges to changes with a guaranteed minimum14
volume for the supplier; (b) adjustment of charges to changes in your business with non-
guaranteed minimum volume; (c) evolution of technology towards market standards;
  end of contract clauses: (a) material reversibility with supplier assistance at the end of the
contract; (b) human reversibility with supplier assistance at the end of the contract; (c)
material reversibility with supplier assistance in case of anticipated contract severance on
your behalf; (d) human reversibility with supplier assistance in case of anticipated contract
severance on your behalf.
Statistical method
We used two statistical techniques to test our model. First, we resorted to Partial Least
Squares (PLS) (Lohmöller, 1989; Hulland, 1999). PLS was preferred over LISREL (Jöreskog
and Sörbom, 1989) because it requires less stringent assumptions about the randomness of the
sample and the distribution of variables. It is also better suited to deal with small data samples
(Fornell, 1982; Wold, 1982, 1985). Second, we also resorted to PLS regression (Umetri,
1996). PLS regression is a statistical method that can deal with multicollinearity issues.
Multicollinearity becomes a concern when there are high intercorrelations among the
independent variables. Our model has built-in multicollinearity. For instance, we
simultaneously expect: (1) core specificity and transactional specificity to impact contract
complexity; (2) core specificity to impact transactional specificity. The PLS regression
algorithm was initially developed by Wold, Martens and Wold (1983) and Wold, Albano,
Dunn, Esbensen, Hellberg, Johansson and Sjöström (1983). It is very frequently used in
chemistry but it can be very useful for management as well. Its mathematical properties have
been described in Helland (1988) and Höskuldsson (1987).15
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The estimation of the model took place in two stages.  First, the reliability and validity of the
measurement (i.e., links between manifest and latent variables) were assessed using PLS.
Second, the causal relationships within the structural model (i.e., links between the latent
variables) were assessed using PLS regression (see Table 5).
Hypothesis 1 is supported ( = 0.14; p < 0.05). Core specificity has a positive impact on
the complexity of outsourcing contracts. When activities are close to the “core business” of a
firm, it is important to have a total control over the vendor.
Hypothesis 2 is supported ( = 0.26; p < 0.01).  Transactional specificity has a positive
impact on the complexity of outsourcing contracts. Hence our results corroborate those of
Joskow (1988a, b and 1990) in the case of service activities outsourcing.
Hypothesis 3 is not supported ( = 0.08; p > 0.10). Relational specificity has no impact on
the complexity of outsourcing contracts. When relational assets have been developed,
contracts are not necessarily complex.
Hypothesis 4 is supported ( = 0.25; p < 0.01). Core specificity has an impact on
transactional specificity. This result suggests that activities that contribute to the competitive
advantage of a firm also rest on transaction specific assets.
Hypothesis 5 is also supported ( = 0.21; p < 0.01). External uncertainty has a positive
impact on the complexity. The higher the uncertainty about the future needs of the
outsourcing client, the more clauses must be included in the contract in order to deal with
unexpected contingencies.  Thus, the contract must be flexible enough to accommodate them.
Control variables
As the data used in this paper was heterogeneous, we wanted to test whether our findings
were robust over different countries, industries and activities.  We ran PLS regressions with
control variables (see Table 5).  Of the three variables, only “activity” turned out to have a16
positive and significant impact on the dependent variables.  In order to further explore the
impact of this variable, we re-ran the model on two sub-samples (i.e. IT activities vs. non-IT
activities).  Our findings turned out to be robust even when splitting the sample into IT
outsourcing vs. non-IT outsourcing operations.  Hence, it seems that IT outsourcing
operations are characterized by higher core specificity, transactional specificity, relational
specificity and external uncertainty than non-IT  outsourcing operations. This results in longer
contracts (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993). In sum, the logic of our model is respected
irrespective of industry, country and activity characteristics. However, the IT outsourcing
contracts are more complex than other contracts.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
One of the most critical aspect of outsourcing is the management of the outsourced resources.
Recently, several empirical studies have stressed the importance of relationships between
outsourcing clients and their vendors especially for services that have direct connections with
manufacturing and core businesses (Huber, 1993; Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Cross, 1995;
Quinn, 2000).  Basically, we have shown that asset specificity is a multi-dimensional concept.
Core and transactional specificity have an impact on the complexity of outsourcing contracts.
On the other hand, relational specificity has no impact on the complexity of outsourcing
contracts.
This study used constructs from Williamson’s works (1979, 1985) to examine
outsourcing and contracts between outsourcing clients and their vendors.  Although TCE is
the main framework to discriminate between transactions that need to be internalized and
transactions that do not, the unique characteristics of outsourcing (e.g., transfer of an in-house
activity with employees, long term dependency towards the vendor, further need to access to
service) may limit the explanatory power of TCE.  Outsourcing addresses the paradox of17
organizations that invested in-house in the past and decided to enter into a long-term
contractual agreement (Walker and Poppo, 1991).
While this study provides important managerial implications, one should note that it has
several limitations.  First, most of the constructs were represented by personal evaluation of
managers involved in the outsourcing decision.  Our priority was to avoid crude and imprecise
proxies.  Since well-informed executives responded to the survey, the quality of their
responses could be assured.  However, the reliability of our variables was not measured on a
very large sample.  Second, we have not focused on the outsourcing decision. Hence we have
not examined the compared internal and external production costs. Despite these limitations,
this study represents one of the first attempts to investigate outsourcing empirically, and
hopefully will open avenues for further research.18
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Table 1. Sample description





North America 20 24%
Activity
Information Technology 44 54%
Non-Information Technology 38 46%26
Table 2: Loadings by construct
Variables used in the model Loadings
(1) Transactional specificity
Time to switch suppliers
Time to reintegrate the outsourced activity





Degree to which the activity contributes to the overall profitability of the firm
Degree to which the activity enables direct contact with the end customer
Degree to which the activity enables the company to differentiate itself from its competitors in the eyes
of the customers






Extent to which dealing with the vendor implied changes for the employees of the client firm




Difficulty of evaluating the future needs in terms of performance
Difficulty of evaluating the future needs in terms of volumes and activity level
Difficulty of evaluating the future needs in terms of technology


















Table 3: Internal consistency and Average Variance Extracted by construct
Latent variables Number of items Internal consistency Average Variance
Extracted
(1) Transactional specificity 3 0.82 0.61
(2) Core specificity 4 0.86 0.55
(3) Relational specificity 2 0.93 0.87
(4) External uncertainty 4 0.87 0.64
(1) Contract complexity 6 0.79 0.5228
Table 4: Correlations between latent variables
Latent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) ()
(1) Transactional specificity 0.78 0.25 0.21 0.33 0.50
(2) Core specificity 0.25 0.74 0.21 0.17 0.37
(3) Relational specificity 0.21 0.21 0.93 0.14 0.25
(4) External uncertainty 0.33 0.17 0.14 0.80 0.35
(1) Contract complexity 0.42 0.22 0.13 0.34 1.0029

























(5) Activity ----- ----- 0.25***
(0.00)
(6) Country ----- ----- -0.02
(0.75)
(7) Industry ----- ----- -0.05
(0.37)
R
2 0.05 0.22 0.26
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01